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COERCION AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
CONSTRUING CHARTER ARTICLE 2(4)
The letter killeth; the spirit giveth life.
2 Corinthians 3:6
Until 1945, there was no customary international prohibition on the unilateral
resort to force. If the circumstances warranted it, and, for signatories to particular
instruments, if certain preliminary procedures had been exhausted, states re-
served the right to resort to force. The United Nations Charter introduced to
international politics a radically new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral
resort to force by states. The principle was enshrined, in its most authoritative
form, in Article 2(4) of the Charter.
1
International law had tolerated unilateral resort to coercion for a simple and
ineluctable reason. In the absence of organized community structures for en-
forcing international rights and, where appropriate, changing them, aggrieved
states had no alternative but recourse to their own means. Many of those who
had deplored this situation acknowledged that there was, alas, no alternative
other than self-help, conducted with the level of coercion the self-helper deemed
appropriate. In this setting, an injunction like Article 2(4) would have been an
implausible utopian expression had it stood by itself.
The United Nations Charter identified the structural defect of the inter-
national political system and created a network of institutions and procedures.
Rather than standing by itself, Article 2(4) was part and parcel of a complex
collective security system. Chapter VI of the Charter established procedures
for pacific settlement of disputes. Chapter VII conferred on the Security Council
a broad competence to act on behalf of the international community with respect
to varying characterizations of unlawful unilateral resorts to force: threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Confronted with such
violations, the Security Council could respond with force, either by calling on
other members or by mobilizing forces that were to be made available to it
under institutional arrangements and with contingency plans devised by a "Mil-
itary Staff Committee" advising and assisting the Council. Thus, Article 2(4)
was never an independent ethical imperative of pacifism. In the instrument in
which it appears, there is full acknowledgment of the indispensability of the
use of force to maintain community order. It is in the context of the Organization
envisaged by the Charter and not as a moral postulate that Article 2(4) acquired
its cogency. If the Organization operated according to its terms, it would have
obviated the need for unilateral recourse to force. Claims worthy of international
protection would have received it from the international community.
' Article 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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There is no need to recite yet again the desuetude of the collective security
arrangements envisioned in the Charter. Intractable conflicts between contending
public order systems with planetary aspirations paralyzed the Security Council.
The UN Charter's mechanisms often proved ineffective. The situation was
reminiscent of the standard American morality play: a town in the "Wild West"
in the 19th century without a sheriff, good people, perforce, carrying their own
weapons and protecting their rights as they see fit. A sheriff comes to town,
announcing that he brings with him law and order. As he will henceforth enforce
the law, individuals no longer need carry weapons and the town need not
tolerate individual resort to force to protect personal rights. Presumably, all
good people would be delighted by this constitutional change and would accept
the new norm prohibiting the unilateral use of force. Suppose, however, that
within six months it becomes clear that the sheriff is utterly incapable of main-
taining order. The rule against unilateral force that he has installed may continue
on the books, but it is difficult to believe that even the best of citizens will
refrain from the techniques of self-help that prevailed before the sheriff's arrival.
This, indeed, is what happened in the international system. Within 5 years
of the creation of the Organization, a pattern, to be reflected thereafter, was
established according to which unilateral violations of Article 2(4) might be
condemned but to all intents and purposes validated, with the violator enjoying
the benefits of its delict. A curious legal gray area extended between the black
letter of the Charter and the bloody reality of world politics. While the general
Charter prohibition against unilateral action continued, and appropriate organs
of the United Nations frequently condemned such action, nothing was done
beyond verbal condemnation. In many cases, the party subject to the condem-
nation, and hence in violation of international law, was permitted to continue
to benefit from the fruits of its illegal action.
If some unilateral coercions are effectively treated as legitimate, the challenge
to contemporary lawyers is not to engage in automatic indiscriminate denun-
ciations of unilateral resorts to coercion by states as violations of Article 2(4).
They must begin to develop a set of criteria for appraising the lawfulness of
unilateral resorts to coercion.
A sine qua non for any action-coercive or otherwise-I submit, is the
maintenance of minimum order in a precarious international system. Will a
particular use of force enhance or undermine world order? When this require-
ment is met, attention may be directed to the fundamental principle of political
legitimacy in contemporary international politics: the enhancement of the on-
going right of peoples to determine their own political destinies. That obvious
point bears renewed emphasis for it is the main purpose of contemporary in-
ternational law: Article 2(4) is the means. The basic policy of contemporary
international law has been to maintain the political independence of territorial
communities so that they can continue to express their desire for political com-
munity in a form appropriate to them.
Article 2(4), like so much in the Charter and in contemporary international
politics, rests on and must be interpreted in terms of this key postulate of
political legitimacy in the 20th century. Each application of Article 2(4) must
enhance opportunities for ongoing self-determination. Though all interventions
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are lamentable, the fact is that some may serve, in terms of aggregate conse-
quences, to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples about their
government and political structure. Others have the manifest objective and
consequence of doing exactly the opposite. There is neither need nor justification
for treating in a mechanically equal fashion Tanzania's intervention in Uganda
to overthrow Amin's despotism, on the one hand, and Soviet intervention in
Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1966 to overthrow popular governments
and to impose an undesired regime on a coerced population, on the other.
Here, as in all other areas of law, it is important to remember that norms are
instruments devised by human beings to precipitate desired social consequences.
One should not seek point-for-point conformity to a rule without constant regard
for the policy or principle that animated its prescription, and with appropriate
regard for the factual constellation in the minds of the drafters.
This point bears emphasis. Legal statements, like all others, are made in a
context whose features are part of the expectations of speaker and audience.
The expression of Article 2(4), in the form of a rule, is premised on a political
context and a technological environment that have been changing inexorably
since the end of the 19th century. The rule assumes that the only threat of
usurpation of the right of political independence of a people within a particular
territorial community is from external, overt invasion. It makes a historicist
assumption as well: internal changes are deemed to be personnel changes in
the composition of an elite which do not bring about basic changes in systems
of public order within the country or in its external political alignments; gov-
ernments come and go, but the life of the people continues in its traditional
fashion. Most important, it does not presuppose division, maintained by a pre-
carious nuclear equipoise, between two contending public order systems, either
of which might find itself substantially disadvantaged and pressed to intense
coercion by the defection of a particular community from its critical de-
fense zone.
The rule formulation of Article 2(4) is oblivious to these factors. Hence, its
purpose notwithstanding, it has been unable to provide would-be strict appliers
with a legal characterization consistent with the relevant international policies
for what are, alas, all too familiar scenarios. In communities without established
or durably institutionalized procedures for the transfer of power, a group of
military officers, without a base of popular support, seizes the government. In
an equally familiar variation of this scenario, the putsch itself is externally inspired,
encouraged and/or financed. As their control is precarious, the officers im-
mediately seek the support of an outside superpower; it responds by providing
military and administrative assistance within the country and material help and
support in external political arenas. Because of this foreign reinforcement, what
would probably have been an evanescent violation of the popular will persists.
Ironically, most of the sequences of this scenario are compatible with traditional
international law and Article 2(4) as it has been mechanically applied. The
usurpers of power may be recognized as a government if they appear to have
effective control, a doctrine established clearly since ChiefJustice Taft's holding
in Tinoco. As such, the new "government" is entitled to request assistance from
abroad. Other governments responding to it are not deemed to be "intervening";
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yet if another foreign force entered the country, put the mutinous military back
in the barracks and reinstalled the ousted government and the former consti-
tutional procedures, it would violate the terms of Article 2(4). The net effect
of a mechanical interpretation of Article 2(4) may be to superimpose on an
unwilling polity an elite, an ideology and an external alignment alien to its
wishes. This may entail far-reaching social and economic changes and grave
deprivations of human rights for substantial numbers and strata of the population.
Recall that all of this occurs in a century whose politics are marked by relentless
mass mobilization, with frequent, radical and far-reaching intervention by the
apparatus of the state.
In consequential terms, the scenarios we have rehearsed are as destructive
of the political independence of the community concerned as would be a massive
invasion by the armed forces of another state. To characterize the second form
of intervention as unlawful and the first as lawful or at least not cognizable by
international law violates the basic policy that international law seeks to achieve
and rapes common sense. No international theory of interpretation worthy of
the name can do this. Plainly, it is necessary to keep in the forefront the basic
policy that animates Article 2(4) and in each case in which its invocation is
appropriate to try to secure an outcome as consistent as possible with it.
Coercion should not be glorified, but it is naive and indeed subversive of
public order to insist that it never be used, for coercion is a ubiquitous feature
of all social life and a characteristic and indispensable component of law. The
critical question in a decentralized system is not whether coercion has been
applied, but whether it has been applied in support of or against community
order and basic policies, and whether it was applied in ways whose net con-
sequences include increased congruence with community goals and min-
imum order.
Interpretation of a constitutive instrument requires principles and procedures
that achieve, in ways appropriate to the context and consistent with the need
for community order, the fundamental policies of the instrument as a whole.
In the construction of Article 2(4), attention must always be given to the spirit
of the Charter and not simply to the letter of a particular provision.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN*
THE LEGALITY OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC INVASION
In the preceding editorial, Coercion and Self-Determination,' Professor Reisman
forcefully argues for the right of a state to use armed force to overthrow a
despotic government in another country. He considers it a "rape of common
sense" to deny the right of forcible intervention in such cases while allowing
foreign aid to repressive regimes that have imposed themselves on an unwilling
populace. His condemnation of external support for repressive governments
* This Editorial Comment was submitted to the Journal while the author was a member of the
Board of Editors. A fuller examination of this thesis, with a review of decisions, will appear in
the 1984 ASIL Proceedings.
1 See p. 642 supra.
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